The National Center for Biomedical Ontology is a consortium that comprises leading informaticians, biologists, clinicians, and ontologists, funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Roadmap, to develop innovative technology and methods that allow scientists to record, manage, and disseminate biomedical information and knowledge in machine-processable form. The goals of the Center are (1) to help unify the divergent and isolated efforts in ontology development by promoting high quality open-source, standards-based tools to create, manage, and use ontologies, (2) to create (...) new software tools so that scientists can use ontologies to annotate and analyze biomedical data, (3) to provide a national resource for the ongoing evaluation, integration, and evolution of biomedical ontologies and associated tools and theories in the context of driving biomedical projects (DBPs), and (4) to disseminate the tools and resources of the Center and to identify, evaluate, and communicate best practices of ontology development to the biomedical community. Through the research activities within the Center, collaborations with the DBPs, and interactions with the biomedical community, our goal is to help scientists to work more effectively in the e-science paradigm, enhancing experiment design, experiment execution, data analysis, information synthesis, hypothesis generation and testing, and understand human disease. (shrink)

The integration of biomedical terminologies is indispensable to the process of information integration. When terminologies are linked merely through the alignment of their leaf terms, however, differences in context and ontological structure are ignored. Making use of the SNAP and SPAN ontologies, we show how three reference domain ontologies can be integrated at a higher level, through what we shall call the OBR framework (for: Ontology of Biomedical Reality). OBR is designed to facilitate inference across the boundaries of domain ontologies (...) in anatomy, physiology and pathology. (shrink)

Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore (...) questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance. (shrink)

In a recent study, we found a negative association between psychopathy and violence against genetic relatives. We interpreted this result as a form of nepotism and argued that it failed to support the hypothesis that psychopathy is a mental disorder, suggesting instead that it supports the hypothesis that psychopathy is an evolved life history strategy. This interpretation and subsequent arguments have been challenged in a number of ways. Here, we identify several misunderstandings regarding the harmful dysfunction definition of mental disorder (...) as it applies to psychopathy and regarding the meaning of nepotism. Furthermore, we examine the evidence provided by our critics that psychopathy is associated with other disorders, and we offer a comment on their alternative model of psychopathy. We conclude that there remains little evidence that psychopathy is the product of dysfunctional mechanisms. (shrink)

Psychopathy refers to a range of complex behaviors and personality traits, including callousness and antisocial behavior, typically studied in criminal populations. Recent studies have used self-reports to examine psychopathic traits among noncriminal samples. The goal of the current study was to examine the underlying factor structure of the Self-Report of Psychopathy Scale–Short Form (SRP-SF) across complementary samples and examine the impact of gender on factor structure. We examined the structure of the SRP-SF among 2,554 young adults from three undergraduate samples (...) and a high-risk young adult sample. Using confirmatory factor analysis, a four-correlated factor model and a four-bifactor model showed good fit to the data. Evidence of weak invariance was found for both models across gender. These findings highlight that the SRP-SF is a useful measure of low-level psychopathic traits in noncriminal samples, although the underlying factor structure may not fully translate across men and women. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

Host-microbiome interactions (HMIs) are critical for the modulation of biological processes and are associated with several diseases, and extensive HMI studies have generated large amounts of data. We propose that the logical representation of the knowledge derived from these data and the standardized representation of experimental variables and processes can foster integration of data and reproducibility of experiments and thereby further HMI knowledge discovery. A community-based Ontology of Host-Microbiome Interactions (OHMI) was developed following the OBO Foundry principles. OHMI leverages established (...) ontologies to create logically structured representations of microbiomes, microbial taxonomy, host species, host anatomical entities, and HMIs under different conditions and associated study protocols and types of data analysis and experimental results. (shrink)

Discuto la tesi di Micheletti secondo la quale ogni spiegazione fattuale presuppone premesse di ordine superiore rispetto alla spiegazione (M.Micheletti, “Radical Divine Alterity and the God-World Relationship”). Nella prima sezione del testo introdurrò la tesi, muovendo dalla analisi di alcuni esempi di spiegazione, ed elencherò le ragioni che (apparentemente) richiedono la postulazione di higher-degree propositions per rendere conto di factual propositions. Nella seconda sezione regimenterò logicamente la tesi di Micheletti. Nella terza sezione discuterò la validità della logica della spiegazione così (...) introdotta, con un’attenzione particolare alla analisi semantica della nozione di spiegazione, allo statuto modale delle ragioni che costituiscono una spiegazione, e all’approccio grammaticale alle higher order propositions. Nella quarta e ultima sezione avanzerò brevissime considerazioni conclusive. (shrink)

Jim Sterba’s Is a Good God Logically Possible? looks to resurrect J. L. Mackie’s logical argument from evil. Sterba accepts the general framework that theists seeking to give a theodicy have favored since Leibniz invented the term: the search for some greater good provided or greater evil averted that would justify God in permitting the type and variety of evil we actually observe. However, Sterba introduces a deontic twist, drawing on the Pauline Principle (let us not do evil that good (...) may come) to introduce three deontic side constraints on God’s choice of action. He then splits the possible goods into four categories: first- vs. second-order goods, goods to which we have a right, and goods to which we do not have a right. He argues that his deontic constraints rule out each combination, thereby showing that no God-justifying good is on offer. To defuse the argument, I draw on a pair of ideas from Marilyn McCord Adams: (i) God is outside the bounds of morality, and (ii) God can defeat evils by incorporating them into an incommensurately valuable friendship with each human. Properly appreciated, these show that the new logical argument relies on a false premise that is not easily repaired. (shrink)

What do normative terms like “obligation” mean in legal contexts? On one view, which H.L.A. Hart may have endorsed, “obligation” is ambiguous in moral and legal contexts. On another, which is dominant in jurisprudence, “obligation” has a distinctively moralized meaning in legal contexts. On a third view, which is often endorsed in philosophy of language, “obligation” has a generic meaning in moral and legal con- texts. After making the nature of and disagreements between these views precise, I show how linguistic (...) data militates against both rivals to the generic meaning view, and argue that this has significant implications for jurisprudence. (shrink)

There are at present two ways in which to evaluate religiously-based claims to accommodation in the legal context. The first, objective approach holds that these claims should be grounded in « facts of the matter » about the religions in question. The second, subjective approach, is grounded in an appreciation by the courts of the sincerity of the claimant. The first approach has the advantage of accounting for the difference between two constitutional principles : freedom of conscience on the one (...) hand, and freedom of religion on the other. It has the disadvantage of transforming courts into expert bodies on religious matters. The subjective approach has a harder time accounting for the distinction. It also risks giving rise to a proliferation of claims. A plausible synthesis between the two approaches requires that we uncover the normative grounds justifying the granting by liberal democracies of religious accommodation. An analogous argument to that put forward by Kymlicka in the case of minority nations identifies the interest that citizens have in being able to exercise their « cultural agency » : the creative reappropriation and reinterpretation of the rituals, practices and norms of religious traditions.Il existe à l’heure actuelle dans le contexte juridique deux principales approches à l’évaluation de la légitimité des demandes d’accommodement pour des motifs religieux. La première, objective, affirme que ces demandes doivent pouvoir s’appuyer dans des faits concernant la religion en question. La seconde, subjective, s’appuie sur l’appréciation de la sincérité de la demande faite par le requérant. La première approche a l’avantage de rendre compte de la distinction entre les deux principes constitutionnels que sont, d’une part, la liberté de conscience, et de l’autre, la liberté de religion. Elle a l’inconvénient de tendre à ériger les tribunaux en « experts » sur des questions religieuses. L’approche subjective rend plus difficilement compte de la distinction entre les deux principes, et de plus risque de donner lieu à une prolifération de demandes. Pour atteindre une synthèse plausible de ces deux approches, il nous faut identifier les fondements normatifs justifiant l’intérêt que les démocraties libérales ont à reconnaître une telle catégorie d’accommodements. En prenant appui dans le célèbre argument de Kymlicka justifiant les droits de nations minoritaires, nous pouvons identifier un intérêt que ces types d’État ont à protéger les conditions permettant aux citoyens de manifester leur « agentivité culturelle », leur capacité à s’identifier en se les réappropriant et en les réinterprétant les normes, pratiques et rites issues de traditions religieuses. (shrink)

Dire de l’islam qu’il s’agit d’une religion relève du truisme. Dire qu’il existe des courants philosophiques divers dans les pays où l’islam est pratiqué est aussi de l’ordre du consensus. Mais affirmer qu’il y a une «philosophie islamique» et que celle-ci n’est ni une théologie ni une philosophie au sens nous l’entendons en Europe et en Amérique n’est pas une chose facile à comprendre. Pourtant penser la philosophique islamique pourrait être une manière renouve­lante de se réapproprier les rapports Orient-Occident avec (...) toutes les difficultés que sous-entend cette catégorisation à l’heure des réseaux planétaires et de la globalisation. (shrink)

This paper seeks to provide an overview of some of the main areas of debate that have emerged in recent years at the interface between theories of justice and health care. First, the paper consi- ders various positions as to what the index of justice with respect to health ought to be. It warns on practical and principled grounds against conceptual inflation of the notion of "health" as it appears in theories of distributive justice. Second, it considers how various standards (...) according to which goods ought to be distributed in a just society apply to debates within health care. (shrink)

In this paper I apply the concept of _inter-Model Inconsistency in Set Theory_ (MIST), introduced by Carolin Antos (this volume), to select positions in the current universe-multiverse debate in philosophy of set theory: I reinterpret H. Woodin’s _Ultimate L_, J. D. Hamkins’ multiverse, S.-D. Friedman’s hyperuniverse and the algebraic multiverse as normative strategies to deal with the situation of de facto inconsistency toleration in set theory as described by MIST. In particular, my aim is to situate these positions on the (...) spectrum from inconsistency avoidance to inconsistency toleration. By doing so, I connect a debate in philosophy of set theory with a debate in philosophy of science about the role of inconsistencies in the natural sciences. While there are important differences, like the lack of threatening explosive inferences, I show how specific philosophical positions in the philosophy of set theory can be interpreted as reactions to a state of inconsistency similar to analogous reactions studied in the philosophy of science literature. My hope is that this transfer operation from philosophy of science to mathematics sheds a new light on the current discussion in philosophy of set theory; and that it can help to bring philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science closer together. (shrink)

Cet article se base sur des résultats d’enquête récents montrant que, chez des adolescents marocains âgés de dix à dix-huit ans, les manifestations de pensée critique dialogique se si-tuent majoritairement dans une « perspective épistémologique » appelée « relativisme » par un modèle développemental élaboré dans les quinze dernières années avec la méthode de la théorie ancrée. Pour comprendre ces résultats de recherche, qui contrastent avec ceux obte-nus auprès d’adolescents québécois et français appartenant aux mêmes groupes d’âge, nous décrivons, dans (...) un premier temps, le modèle développemental dans lequel ils prennent sens. Nous illustrons ensuite les manifestations de « perspective épistémologique relativiste » chez les adolescents marocains à l’aide d’extraits de verbatim. Les élèves ont tendance à se décen-trer de leur vécu personnel, à se représenter le point de vue d’autrui en général et à co-construire des points de vue convergents avec les pairs. Dans un deuxième temps, prenant appui sur une approche de la représentation sociale en tant que « scène », et sur la littérature touchant aux rôles des aînés dans les sociétés africaines, nous éclairons ces résultats de re-cherche par l’analyse d’une représentation sociale fréquemment mobilisée par les jeunes Ma-rocains interviewés : celle de la hiérarchie des âges et du devoir d’écoute envers les plus âgés. L’analyse de cette « scène » met en lumière des attitudes sociales inculquées aux adolescents en contexte culturel marocain, susceptibles de favoriser le développement d’une « perspective épistémologique relativiste » en matière de pensée critique dialogique. (shrink)

In «Mancanze, omissioni, e descrizioni negative»,55 Achille Varzi esplora le conseguenze di una forma comune di ragionamento causale, quella in cui citiamo mancanze od omissioni nel fornire una spiegazione delle cause degli eventi. Tale forma appare di comune uso nei contesti normativi del diritto, nelle spiegazioni tipiche delle scienze sociali e, più in generale, nel ragionamento ordinario. Ciò che accomuna questi casi è l’idea intuitiva secondo cui le cause possono anche consistere in eventi negativi. L’intuizione non è però metafisicamente innocua, (...) poiché per affermare che una spiegazione come "C’è stata un’esplosione perché Gianni non ha spento il gas" sia una buona spiegazione, occorre assumere che gli eventi negativi come “il non aver spento il gas da parte di Gianni” esistano al pari di eventi come l’esplosione e dal momento che, solo se sono entrambi eventi, può tra questi sussistere una relazione casuale. Dovremmo pertanto concludere che (1) è perfettamente intellegibile e rispecchia le nostre pratiche linguistiche. Spesso parliamo assumendo che ci siano cose che le persone non fanno: il gas che Gianni non ha spento, la passeggiata che non abbiamo fatto, il treno che non è arrivato, ecc. La sensatezza di questi usi esige pertanto il dover riconoscere una certa legittimità al vocabolario delle omissioni e delle descrizioni negative. Varzi sostiene che questo modo di parlare solleva tuttavia degli scrupoli ontologici,56 poiché non è possibile assumersi alcun serio impegno ontologico nei confronti di eventi negativi, ancor meno quando le nostre asserzioni richiedono di quantificare su eventi “inesistenti”. Una strategia per ovviare a questo scrupolo è sostenere che queste pratiche linguistiche sono analoghe a quelle in cui parliamo di oggetti “inesistenti”, ossia di oggetti che è come se ci fossero, ma che riconosciamo esistere soltanto in un contesto finzionale. Dunque l’analogia con gli oggetti finzionali può rendere in qualche modo espliciti i vincoli ontologici, giustificando quegli usi linguistici. Sebbene questo argomento abbia la sua plausibilità, Varzi nota che «ad un esame più attento, gli eventi non accaduti si rivelano ben più resistenti al rasoio di Occam di quanto l’analogia con gli oggetti non esistenti suggerisca » poiché il nostro linguaggio causale ci induce spesso a ritenere che «il riferimento o la quantificazione nei confronti di eventi non accaduti sia da intendersi in senso stretto e letterale»,57 in contrasto con quanto suggerisce l’analogia con gli oggetti finzionali. La difficoltà nasce dall’argomento per cui, se la causazione è una relazione tra eventi, occorre prendere sul serio l’idea che gli eventi negativi siano negativi stricto sensu. La tesi di Varzi è che questa tesi sia una contraddizione genuina e che l’unico modo di risolverla sia di rinunciare all’idea che gli eventi negativi esistano in un qualsiasi senso. In questo articolo intendo analizzare un aspetto di questa forma di parsimonia ontologica. Il mio intento è di valutare le conseguenze della tesi di Varzi dal punto di vista della spiegazione causale in contesti controfattuali e nei casi di omissione del diritto. (shrink)

Logique et existenceDeleuze à propos des « conditions du réel »Pour Deleuze, l’un des problèmes fondamentaux d’une théorie de la pensée est de savoir comment la pensée peut quitter la sphère du possible pour penser le réel, c’est-àdire pour penser l’existence elle-même. La position du réel semble être hors du concept. Des pré-kantiens comme Leibniz approchaient ce problème par le biais de la distinction entre vérités d’essence et vérités d’existence, alors que des post-kantiens comme Maimon l’approchaient par la distinction entre (...) les conditions de l’expérience possible et celles de l’expérience réelle. La logique classique définit la sphère du possible par trois principes logiques – l’identité, la non-contradiction et le tiers-exclu – et la présente étude examine les trois grandes trajectoires qui, dans cette histoire de la philosophie, ont tenté d’utiliser l’un de ces trois principes classiques pour pénétrer l’existence ellemême : 1) Leibniz (et les pré-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de d’identité àl’existence entière ; 2) Hegel (et les post-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de non-contradiction à la totalité de l’expérience ; et 3) le groupe des penseurs appelés de manière assez large « existentialistes » cherchait à étendre le principe du tiers-exclu à la totalité de l’existence. La conclusion examine les raisons pour lesquelles Deleuze a été fasciné par chacune de ces tentatives philosophiques pour « penser l’existence », tout en pensant néanmoins qu’elles ont toutes échoué ; et pourquoi aussi il a fini par développer sa propre réponse au problème en faisant appel à un principe de différence.Logica e EsistenzaLe ‘Condizioni del reale’ in DeleuzePer Deleuze, uno dei problemi fondamentali per una teoria del pensiero è: come può il pensiero abbandonare la sfera del possibile per pensare il reale, ossia, pensare l’esistenza stessa? La posizione del reale sembra essere fuori dal concetto. Prekantiani come Leibniz affrontano questo problema in termini di distinzione fra verità dell’essenza e verità dell’esistenza, mentre post-kantiani come Maimon affrontano il problema in termini di distinzione fra condizioni dell’esperienza possibile e condizioni dell’esperienza reale. La logica classica ha definito la sfera del possibile secondo tre principi logici – identità, non-contraddizione, terzo escluso – e questo saggio analizza tre grandi ‘parabole’ della storia della filosofia che hanno tentato di usare uno di questi tre principi della logica per penetrare l’esistenza stessa: (1) Leibniz (e i pre-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di identità a tutta l’esistenza; (2) Hegel (ei post-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di non-contraddizione a tutta l’esistenza; (3) il gruppo di pensatori (solo approssimativamente legati fra loro) chiamati “esistenzialisti” ha tentato di estendere il principio del terzo escluso all’esistenza. La conclusione analizza sia le ragioni per le quali Deleuze era affascinato da ciascuno di questi tentativi filosofici di “pensare l’esistenza” nonostante fosse convinto che essi avessero fallito, sia i motivi per cui egli in conclusione traccia la propria risposta al problema facendo appello al principio della differenza. (shrink)

The main assumption and conclusion of this book is summarized by Nietzsche’s thought and his single sentence (Motto): "The tragic era for Europe: due to the struggle with nihilism. (Das tragische Zeitalter für Europa: bedingt durch den Kampf mit dem Nihilismus). " eKGWB/NF-1886, 7 [31]. I have translated the entire group of notes that start with a note giving Nietzsche’s location “Lenzer Heide” (Graubünden, Switzerland) dated June 10, 1887 (Lenzer Heide den 10. Juni 1887). From the first note, eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 (...) [71] and then subsection ending at the final note: eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 [110]. Also in this publication, Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden (KSA). Volume information, KSA 12. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, (1967). Section or notebook, five. 5 = NVÜ3. Sommer 1886—Herbst 1887. The Lenzer Heide subsection is from 5 [71] and goes to section 5 [110]. Pages for this subsection are p. 211-229 (KSA 12). The editor sometimes use letter spacing as way to emphasis what Nietzsche wrote, for example, “N i h i l i s m u s”; for the word ‘Nihilismus’. Over 190+ Nietzsche’s notes are translated in this text. Additional materials from his published writing are also included in the topics discussed. The general background is the context of Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretations. Principle conclusion: all of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought can be seen as his response to the urgent crisis of Nihilism. Countermovement to Nihilism. Additional topics and many more translations covering: the eternal return of the same, Will to Power, B. Spinoza (1632-1677), concept of meaninglessness, Nihilism and Nietzsche Thought, Stages or the outline of Nihilism, Chronological Nietzsche’s Thoughts on Nihilism, and Nietzsche on the Nihilist. Other topics covered are: Nietzsche Contra Metaphysics: Rejection of ontology and Being Rejection of God Rejection of metaphysicians Rejection of the idea of eternal Rejection of supersensuous Rejection of Platonism Rejection of the dignity of humanity (metaphysicians) Rejection of eternal values Rejection of immorality Possible Metaphysical Claims for the idea of Will-to-Power, Connection of Will to Power and Amor Fati, Anti-metaphysical and perspectivism, Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy, and Bibliographic sources. (shrink)

Názory na historickou identitu Laoziho a na vznik a výklad Dao De Jingu se v průběhu dvacátého století silně rozrůznily. V tomto článku nejprve stručně představuji tradiční a modifikovaně-tradiční náhled na Laoziho a Dao De Jing. Poté se obšírněji věnuji genesi taoismu podle Russella Kirklanda. Tento americký badatel ve své knize Taoism: The Enduring Tradition (2004) syntetickým způsobem předkládá výsledky mnoha specializovaných studií, vedených historicko-kritickou metodou známou např. z biblické hermeneutiky. Kirkland hájí mj. následující čtyři teze: (1) Laozi je fiktivní (...) osoba, (2) Dao De Jing je výsledkem komplexního redakčního procesu, (3) Dao De Jing je hromada přísloví, nikoli dílo jednotné vize, (4) taoismus jakožto identifikovatelné hnutí vznikl až v 5. stol. n.l. Přes výhrady, které vůči Kirklandovým tezím vyjádřuji v tomto svém článku, je třeba jeho knihu považovat za zásadně přínosnou výzvu pro všechny taoistické badatele. (shrink)

J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence suffers (...) from transworld depravity. (shrink)

This paper assesses J. L. Schellenberg’s account of propositional faith and, in light of that assessment, sketches an alternative that avoids certain objections and coheres better with Schellenberg’s aims.

Do we rightly expect a perfectly loving God to bring it about that, right now, we reasonably believe that He exists? It seems so. For love at its best desires the well-being of the beloved, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly participating in her life in a personal fashion, allowing her to draw from that relationship what she may need to flourish. But why suppose that we would be significantly better off were God to engage in an explicit, (...) personal relationship with us? Well, first, there would be broadly moral benefits. We would be able to draw on the resources of that relationship to overcome seemingly everpresent flaws in our character. And we would be more likely to emulate the self-giving love with which we were loved. So loved, we would be more likely to flourish as human beings. Secondly, there would be experiential benefits. We would be, for example, more likely to experience peace and joy stemming from the strong conviction that we were properly related to our Maker, security in suffering knowing that, ultimately, all shall be well, and there would be the sheer pleasure of God's loving presence. As a consequence of these moral and experiential benefits, our relationships with others would likely improve. Thirdly, to be personally related to God is intrinsically valuable, indeed, according to the Christian tradition, the greatest intrinsic good. In these ways our well-being would be enhanced if God were to relate personally to us. Moreover, the best love does not seek a personal relationship only for the sake of the beloved. As Robert Adams rightly notes, "It is an abuse of the word 'love' to say that one loves a person, or any other object, if one does not care, except instrumentally, about one's relation to that object."1 Thus, God would want a personal relationship with us not only for the benefit we would receive from it but for its own sake as well. So, if a perfectly loving God exists, He wants a personal relationship with us, or more accurately, every capable creature, those cognitively and affectively equipped to relate personally with Him.. (shrink)

This interview, conducted over the span of several months, tracks the respective journeys of Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Rather than “becoming Deleuzian,” which is neither desirable nor possible, these exchanges reflect an array of encounters with Deleuze. These include the initial discoveries of Deleuze’s writings by Boundas and Smith, in-person meetings between Boundas and Deleuze, and the wide-ranging and influential philosophical work on Deleuze’s concepts produced by both Boundas and Smith. (...) At stake in this discussion are key contributions by Deleuze to continental philosophy, including the distinction between the virtual and the actual and the very nature of a “concept.” Also at stake is the formative or pedagogical impact of a philosopher, like Deleuze, on those who find and fully engage with his texts, concepts, and project. Cette interview, menée sur plusieurs mois, suit les parcours respectifs de Constantin V. Boundas et Daniel W. Smith avec la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze. Au lieu de « devenir Deleuzien, » ce qui n’est ni souhaitable ni possible, ces échanges reflètent un éventail de rencontres avec Deleuze. Il s’agit notamment des premières découvertes des écrits de Deleuze par Boundas et Smith, des rencontres en personne entre Boundas et Deleuze, et du travail philosophique vaste et in????luent sur les concepts de Deleuze produit par Boundas et Smith. L’enjeu ici étant les contributions clés de Deleuze à la philosophie continentale, y compris la distinction entre le virtuel et l’actuel, et la nature même d’un « concept. » Mais il y a aussi l’impact formateur ou pédagogique d’un philosophe, comme Deleuze, sur ceux qui trouvent et s’engagent pleinement dans ses textes, ses concepts et ses projets. (shrink)

I argue that rather than dismiss Foucault’s first book, Mental Illness and Personality, as an “apologetic exposition of Pavlov’s reflexology,” we ought see it as a valuable source documenting Foucault’s change of attitude towards psychology and the history of science in the early 1950s. I argue that there are two distinguishable strands that make up the text. The ‘frame’ of the book—the introduction, first chapter of the second part and conclusion of the book—is expressive of a critical attitude towards psychology, (...) and indicative of rather sophisticated conception of the history of science as a critical history aimed at bringing into view the unscientific forces that shape scientific labor. The ‘main body’ of the text—the first part and the second chapter of the second part—by contrast, reads as the history of the steady dialectical progress of the psychological sciences towards an ever more accurate understanding of mental illness. It is thus indicative to a naïve approach to psychology and to its history. The tension between the two strands of the book thus documents the starting point of Foucault’s then shifting attitudes toward the psychological sciences and the history of science, and the set of questions and sources that lead him to problematize his understanding of and approach to the latter. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à élucider la fonction du concept de constitution dans la théorie idéaliste transcendantale des Ideen I de Husserl. Après avoir établi que le concept de constitution renvoie toujours dans la phénoménologie statique de Husserl à la propriété fondamentale qu’a la conscience intentionnelle de produire le sens de l’objet (Seinssinn), l’article se concentre par la suite à montrer que le projet général que poursuit les Ideen I est celui de comprendre la manière particulière par laquelle le réal arrive (...) à se manifester à la conscience. En passant par la théorie du noème, on arrive, à travers cette compréhension du concept de constitution, à montrer en quel sens l’objet réal se constitue par et dans la conscience comme un « X identique », un objet purement « formel », marqué par l’absence de toute détermination, et comme un « centre unificateur » grâce auquel les différents sens « objectifs » s’y greffent à titre de « prédicats ». C’est alors qu’on comprendra in fine que le concept de constitution joue pour la phénoménologie des Ideen I une fonction épistémologico-phénoménologique. (shrink)

This is a 5,000 word article on divine hiddeness, with special attention to John Schellenberg's work on the topic.

Moral sentimentalism can be understood as a metaethical theory, a normative theory, or some combination of the two. Metaethical sentimentalism emphasizes the role of affect in the proper psychology of moral judgment, while normative sentimentalism emphasizes the centrality of warm emotions to the phenomena of which these judgments properly approve. Neither form of sentimentalism necessarily implies a commitment to virtue ethics, but both have an elective affinity with it. The classical metaethical sentimentalists of the Scottish Enlightenment—such as David Hume and (...) Adam Smith—were all, to a greater or lesser extent, also virtue theorists. The connection is even stronger in the case of Enlightenment philosophers who were also normative sentimentalists , as with Frances Hutcheson. For Hutcheson, virtue simply is a habit of acting from the warm motive of universal benevolence. Today, neo-sentimentalist metaethicists such as Allan Gibbard, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson generally remain agnostic on the question of whether virtue ethics is superior to its deontological and consequentialist competitors. Michael Slote, however, has developed a comprehensive theory of sentimentalist care ethics in an unambiguously virtue-centered form. (shrink)

Achille Varzi è uno dei maggiori metafisici viventi. Nel corso degli anni ha scritto testi fondamentali di logica, metafisica, mereologia, filosofia del linguaggio. Ha sconfinato nella topologia, nella geografia, nella matematica, ha ragionato di mostri e confini, percezione e buchi, viaggi nel tempo, nicchie, eventi e ciambelle; e non ha disdegnato di dialogare con gli abitanti di Flatlandia, con Neo e con Terminator. Tra le sue opere principali: Holes and Other Superficialities e Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, (...) entrambi scritti insieme a R. Casati per MIT Press; Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza; e il suo libro più recente: Le tribolazioni del filosofare, con C. Calosi, per Laterza. -/- Da una giornata all’Università di Urbino nasce questa conversazione a molte voci sulla e con la filosofia di Achille C. Varzi. In un dialogo critico al quale l’Autore si presta con generosità e onestà intellettuale, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Calemi, Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Pierluigi Graziani, Patrizia Pedrini, Daniele Santoro e Giuliano Torrengo lo interrogano e mettono alla prova sui temi affrontati, nel corso degli anni, in campi diversi. Il risultato è un percorso che si snoda attraverso molti mondi, dalla logica alla metafisica, dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla mereologia alla filosofia del tempo, spingendosi in qualche caso oltre i confini del saggio filosofico. (shrink)

Daniel Bell and Wang Pei’s recent monograph, Just Hierarchy, seeks to defend hierarchical relationships against more egalitarian alternatives. This paper addresses their argument, offered in one chapter of the book, in favour of a hierarchical relationship between human and nonhuman animals. This relationship, Bell and Pei argue, should conform to what they call “subordination without cruelty:” it is permissible to subordinate and exploit animals for human ends, provided that we do not treat them cruelly. We focus on three aspects (...) of their view: their argument for a hierarchical view; their understanding of cruelty; and their account of the heightened duties they claim we owe to nonhuman animals who are intelligent, domesticated, and/or “cute.” We argue that the reasons that Bell and Pei offer fail to support their conclusions, and that, even if one accepts a hierarchical view, the conclusions that Bell and Pei draw about the permissibility of practices such as killing animals for food do not follow. We conclude by emphasizing philosophers’ responsibility to thoroughly test their arguments and to engage with existing debates, especially when the practices they seek to justify involve harms of great magnitude. (shrink)

In the ontology of the artwork and its regimes of existence, Gérard Genette gives but little room to the theory and practice of restoration. However, restoration is seen in relation to the identity of the work itself and to its material and pragmatic temporality and anachronism. In the wake of Nelson Goodman, it is also understood as a form of actuation and implementaion of the aesthetic experience. Starting from these premises, the present essay intends to examine the relationship between Genette’s (...) and Daniel Arasse’s reflections on restoration and the history of art, highlighting their similarities and differences with Cesare Brandi’s theory of restoration and, therefore, pointing out their as yet undischarged debts to Sartre’s phenomenology of image. (shrink)

In the ontology of the artwork and its regimes of existence, Gérard Genette gives but little room to the theory and practice of restoration. However, restoration is seen in relation to the identity of the work itself and to its material and pragmatic temporality and anachronism. In the wake of Nelson Goodman, it is also understood as a form of actuation and implementaion of the aesthetic experience. Starting from these premises, the present essay intends to examine the relationship between Genette’s (...) and Daniel Arasse’s reflections on restoration and the history of art, highlighting their similarities and differences with Cesare Brandi’s theory of restoration and, therefore, pointing out their as yet undischarged debts to Sartre’s phenomenology of image. (shrink)

"La gente ripete più e più volte che la filosofia non progredisce davvero, che siamo ancora occupati con gli stessi problemi filosofici come erano i greci. Ma le persone che dicono questo non capiscono perché deve essere così. È perché il nostro linguaggio è rimasto lo stesso e continua a sedurrci a fare le stesse domande. Finché continua ad essere un verbo - per essere - che sembra come se funziona allo stesso modo come "mangiare e bere", fintanto che abbiamo (...) ancora gli aggettivi , identici , , , , , false , , possibile , fino a quando continuiamo a parlare di un fiume di tempo, di una distesa di spazio, ecc. , ecc, la gente continuerà a inciampare sulle stesse difficoltà sconcertanti e si troverà a fissare qualcosa che nessuna spiegazione sembra in grado di chiarire. E per di più, questo soddisfa il desiderio del trascendente, perché, nella misura in cui la gente pensa di poter vedere i limitidella comprensione umana, credono ovviamente chepossano vedere al di là di questi.` ' Questa citazione è di Ludwig Wittgenstein che ha ridefinito la filosofia circa 70 anni fa (ma la maggior parte delle persone deve ancora scoprirlo). Dennett, anche se è stato un filosofo per circa 40 anni, è uno di loro. È anche curioso che sia lui che il suo primo antagonista, John Searle, abbiano studiato sotto famosi Wittgensteinians (Searle con John Austin, Dennett con Gilbert Ryle) ma Searle ha più o meno ottenuto il punto e Dennett no, (anche se si sta ccmute cose per chiamare Searle o Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett è un duro determinista (anche se cerca di intrufolarsi nella porta sul retro), e forse questo è dovuto a Ryle, il cui famoso libro - Il concetto di mente (1949) continua ad essere ristampato. Quel libro ha fatto un ottimo lavoro di esorciscazione del fantasma,, ma ha lasciato la macchina. Dennett si diverte a commettere gli errori che Wittgenstein, Ryle (e molti altri da allora) hanno esposto in dettaglio. Il nostro uso delle parole coscienza, scelta, libertà, intenzione, particella, pensiero, determina, onda, causa, accaduto, evento (e così via all'infinito) sono raramente fonte diconfusione, ma non appena lasciamo la vita normale ed entriamo nella filosofia (e qualsiasi discussione staccata dall'ambiente in cui il linguaggio si è evoluto,cioè, regna il contesto esatto in cui le parole avevano significatoilcaos). Come la maggior parte, Dennett manca di un quadro coerente - che Searle ha chiamato la struttura logica della razionalità. Ho ampliato su questo considerevolmente da quando ho scritto questa recensione e i miei articoli recenti mostrano in dettaglio cosa c'è di sbagliato con l'approccio di Dennett alla filosofia, che si potrebbe chiamare Scientismo sugli steroidi. Permettetemi di concludere con un'altra citazione di Wittgenstein-- l'ambizione è la morte del pensiero. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

«Les gens disent encore et encore que la philosophie ne progresse pas vraiment, que nous sommes toujours occupés avec les mêmes problèmes philosophiques que les Grecs. Mais les gens qui disent cela ne comprennent pas pourquoi il doit en être ainsi. C’est parce que notre langue est restée la même et continue de nous séduire à poser les mêmes questions. Tant qu’il continue à y avoir un verbe qui ressemble à s’il fonctionne de la même manière que de manger et (...) de boire, tant que nous avons encore les adjectifs 'identiques', 'faux', 'false', 'possible', tant que nous continuons à parler d’une rivière du temps, d’une étendue d’espace, etc., etc., les gens continueront à trébucher sur les mêmes difficultés déroutantes et se retrouveront à regarder quelque chose qui ne semble pas capable de se dégager. Et qui plus est, cela satisfait un désir pour le transcendant, parce que, dans la mesure où les gens pensent qu’ils peuvent voir les ‘«limites de la compréhension humaine », ils croient bien sûr ce ils peuvent voir au-delà de ceux-ci. Cette citation est de Ludwig Wittgenstein qui a redéfini la philosophie il ya 70 ans (mais la plupart des gens n’ont pas encore de le savoir). Dennett, bien qu’il ait été un philosophe pendant une quarantaine d’années, est l’un d’entre eux. Il est également curieux que lui et son antagoniste principal, John Searle, étudié sous les célèbres Wittgensteiniens (Searle avec John Austin, Dennett avec Gilbert Ryle) mais Searle plus ou moins obtenu le point et Dennett n’a pas, (bien qu’il est étirer les choses à appeler Searle ou Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett est un déterministe difficile (bien qu’il essaie de se faufiler la réalité dans la porte arrière), et peut-être cela est dû à Ryle, dont le célèbre livre "Le concept de l’esprit" (The Concept of Mind) (1949) continue d’être réimprimé. Ce livre a fait un excellent travail d’exorciser le fantôme, mais il a quitté la machine. Dennett aime faire les erreurs Wittgenstein, Ryle (et beaucoup d’autres depuis) ont exposé en détail. Notre utilisation des mots conscience, choix, liberté, intention, particule, pensée, détermine, vague, cause, arrivé, événement (et ainsi de suite sans fin) sont rarement une source de confusion, mais dès que nous quittons la vie normale et entrer dans la philosophie (et toute discussion détachée de l’environnement dans lequel la langue a évolué-c’est-à-dire le contexte exact dans lequel les mots avaient un sens) chaos règne. Comme la plupart, Dennett n’a pas un cadre cohérent - que Searle a appelé la structure logique de la rationalité. J’ai développé sur ce considérablement depuis que j’ai écrit cette revue et mes articles récents montrent en détail ce qui ne va pas avec l’approche de Dennett à la philosophie, que l’on pourrait appeler Scientism sur les stéroïdes. Permettez-moi de terminer par une autre citation de Wittgenstein-- «L’ambition est la mort de la pensée. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systèmes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2020) et autres. (shrink)

ROUDAUT (François) & STOFFEL (Jean-François), Avant-propos (pp. 371-372). BLAY (Michel), Soleil de Copernic et soleil de Galilée (pp. 373-389). MEHL (Édouard), Le Soleil au cinquième concile du Latran (1512-1516) : Copernic et la réforme du calendrier julien (pp. 391-408). STOFFEL (Jean-François), «Qui choisirait de poser ce flambeau dans un lieu autre ou meilleur que celui d’où il peut illuminer le tout simultanément ?»: examen de la pertinence d’un argument copernicien de convenance (pp. 409-458). ROUDAUT (François), Le Soleil chez quelques lexicographes (...) et vulgarisateurs (pp. 459-485). CÉARD (Jean), Le Soleil selon les physiciens de la Renaissance (pp. 487-498). MÉNAGER (Daniel), Le soleil dans les fêtes de cour sous les derniers Valois (pp. 499-510). SEIDENGART (Jean), La parenté du Soleil et des étoiles fixes dans la cosmologie de Giordano Bruno (pp. 511-529). ŠPELDA (Daniel), Les soleils et leurs observateurs au XVIIe siècle (pp. 531-577). MELLINGHOFF-BOURGERIE (Viviane), Connivences héliologiques entre théologie et astronomie chez François de Sales et Bérulle: le cas du barnabite Redento Baranzano (pp. 579-610). NEJESCHLEBA (Tomáš), De la métaphysique de la lumière à l’héliocentrisme: la vision du Soleil selon Valérien Magni (pp. 611-627). Les auteurs (pp. 629-630). (shrink)

Praktykowanie teorii. Koncepty wczesnych prac Daniela Libeskinda jako wzorce realnej architektury Treści wczesnych prac Libeskinda, w tym zwłaszcza idee zawarte w cyklach rysunków pod nazwą Micromegas: The Architecture of End Space (1979) i Chamber Works: Architectural Meditations on the Themes from Heraclitus (1983) oraz trzy maszyny określone jako Three Lessons in Architecture (1985) w decydujący sposób wpłynęły na wszystkie późniejsze realizacje architekta. Prace te w dużym zakresie zmieniły zasady oddzielania teorii od praktyki budowlanej, w tym tak- że odgraniczania architektury od (...) literatury czy filozofii. Już Micromegas były polemiką z traktowaniem rysunku architektonicznego wyłącznie jako utylitarnego narzędzia w procesie stwarzania budowli i postawiły na uczynienie z tej techniki pełnoprawnej postaci realnej architektury. Chamber Works w jeszcze większym stopniu niż prace z serii Micromegas akcentowały samodzielność rysunku i jego odrębność od wszelkiej rzeczywistości czy zewnętrznych źródeł treści. Maszyny połączone w Three Lessons in Architecture streszczały dokonania dawnych epok historii sztuki budowania. Reading Machine opowiadała o rzemieślniczych początkach, Memory Machine o intelektualizmie okresu nowożytnego, Writing Machine zaś o współczesnym okresie mechanizacji pamięci i kreacji. Zadaniem maszyn była metafizyczna refleksja nad głównymi założeniami i mitami architektury, a zarazem przeniesienie tej refleksji na poziom doświadczenia zmysłowego. W berlińskim Jüdisches Museum wymyślone liternictwo architektoniczne połączyło się z narracją na temat zagłady żydowskich mieszkańców miasta. Libeskind wykreował nie tyle budowlę,ile literacką relację o zbrodni przełamującej historię ludzkość. (shrink)

The paper follows the thesis, that the perception of real or virtual media shares the anthropological state of "Ausdruckswahrnehmung" or perception of expression (Ernst Cassirer). This kind of perception does not represent a distant, neutral point of view, but one that is guided by feelings or "vitality affects" (Daniel N. Stern). The prerequisites, however, for triggering these feelings/"vitality affects" are not recognizable objects or motifs, but rather their sensually evaluable “abstract representations” or their formal logical structures. In contrast to (...) aesthetic feelings, however, they affect not only our feelings of lust or unlust or our knowledge (formal aesthetics) but also our actions (semiotics). So, when I extend aesthetic experiences to semiotic effects, I will talk about vitality semiotics. This new concept is of consequence, because the thesis of the responsibility of the producer is based on these effects. This is to be carried out by analyzing and presenting the approach of the Bauhaus master Josef Albers. (shrink)

On doxastic theories of propositional faith,necessarily,S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it’s false that,necessarily,S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this article, I defend three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to published criticisms of them.

In this paper we aim to think systematically about, formulate, and begin addressing some of the challenges to applying theories of moral responsibility to behaviors shaped by a particular subset of unsettling psychological complexities: namely, implicit biases.

Horwich dà una bella analisi di Wittgenstein (W) ed è uno studioso W leader, ma a mio parere, tutti non sono al di sotto di un pieno apprezzamento, come spiego a lungo in questa recensione e molti altri. Se non si capisce W (e preferibilmente anche Searle) allora non vedo come si possa avere più di una comprensione superficiale della filosofia e del pensiero di ordine superiore e quindi di tutti i comportamenti complessi (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, storia, letteratura, società). In (...) poche parole, W ha dimostrato che quando hai dimostrato come una frase viene usata nel contesto di interesse, non c'è più nulla da dire. Inizierò con alcune citazioni degne di nota e poi darò quelle che penso siano le considerazioni minime necessarie per capire Wittgenstein, la filosofia e il comportamento umano. La prima si potrebbe notare che mettere "meta" davanti a qualsiasi parola dovrebbe essere sospetto. W ha osservato ad esempio, che la metamatematica è matematica come qualsiasi altra. L'idea che possiamo uscire dalla filosofia (cioè la psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore) è di per sé una profonda confusione. Un'altra irritazione qui (e per tutta la scrittura accademica negli ultimi 4 decenni) è il costante sessismo linguistico inverso di "lei" e "suo" e "lei" o "lui/ lei" ecc., dove "loro" e "loro" e "loro" farebbero bene. Allo stessomodo, l'uso della parola francese "repertorio" in cui l'inglese "repertorio" farà abbastanza bene. La carenza principale è il fallimento completo (anche se molto comune) di impiegare quello che vedo come la vista di due sistemi estremamente potente e intuitiva del quadro di HOT e Searle che ho delineato sopra. Questo è particolarmente toccante nel capitolo sul significato p111 et seq. (soprattutto nelle note a piè di pagina 2-7), dove nuotiamo in acqua molto fangosa senza la struttura di vero automatizzato solo S1, proposizionale disposizionale S2, COS ecc. Si può anche ottenere una migliore vista dell'interno e dell'esterno leggendo ad esempio, Johnston o Budd (vedi le mie recensioni). Horwich però fa molti commenti incisivi. Mi è piaciuto soprattutto il suo riassunto dell'importazione della posizione anti-teorica di W su p65. Ha bisogno di dare più enfasi a 'On Certainty', recentemente oggetto di grande sforzo di Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva e altri e riassunto nei miei recenti articoli. Horwich è di prim'ordine e il suo lavoro vale la pena. Si spera che lui (e tutti) studierà Searle e un po 'di psicologia moderna così come Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker ecc per raggiungere una vasta visione moderna del comportamento. La maggior parte dei loro documenti sono su academia dot edu e philpapers dot org etc. Egli dà uno dei più bei riassunti di dove una comprensione di Wittgenstein ci lascia che io abbia mai visto. "Non ci deve essere alcun tentativo di spiegare la nostra attività linguistico/concettuale (PI 126) come nella riduzione dell'aritmetica di Frege alla logica; nessun tentativo di dargli basi epistemologiche (PI 124) come nei resoconti basati sul significato di una conoscenza a priori; nessun tentativo di caratterizzarne le forme idealizzate (PI 130) come nelle logiche del senso; nessun tentativo di riformarlo (PI 124, 132) come nella teoria degli errori di Mackie o nell'intuizione di Dummett; nessun tentativo di snellirla (PI 133) come nel racconto dell'esistenza di Quine; nessun tentativo di renderlo più coerente (PI 132) come nella risposta di Tarski ai paradossi bugiar; e nessun tentativo di renderlo più completo (PI 133) come nel sistemare le questioni di identità personale per bizzarri scenari ipotetici di 'teletrasporto'." Infine, lasciatemi suggerire che con la prospettiva che ho incoraggiato qui, W è al centro della filosofia contemporanea e della psicologia e non è oscura, difficile o irrilevante, ma scintillante, profonda e cristallina e che permane lo è mancare una delle più grandi avventure intellettualipossibili. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up with an architecture (...) of the mind in which emotions are fully accommodated through their relations to the rest of cognition. Our article focuses on arguing for this general approach; as such, it is an essay in the philosophy of emotion rather than in the psychology or neuroscience of emotion. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows (...) that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth-century, and Smith is widely recognized to be one of his most penetrating interpreters, as well as an important philosophical voice in his own right. Combining his most important pieces over the last fifteen years along with two new essays, this book is Smith 's definitive treatise on Deleuze. The essays are divided into four sections, which cover Deleuze's use of the history of philosophy, an overview of his philosophical (...) system, an analysis of several Deleuzian concepts, as well as an assessment of his position within contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Our approach to emotion emphasized three key ingredients. We do not yet have a mature science of emotion, or even a consensus view—in this respect we are more hesitant than Sander, Grandjean, and Scherer or Luiz Pessoa. Relatedly, a science of emotion needs to be highly interdisciplinary, including ecology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. We recommend a functionalist view that brackets conscious experiences and that essentially treats emotions as latent variables inferred from a number of measures. But our version of functionalism (...) is not definitional or ontological. It is resolutely methodological, in good part because it is too early to attempt definitions. (shrink)